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Article III, Section 1 — Congressional Power to Establish Article III Courts

Article III, Section 1

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Essays on this page (7)

ArtIII.S1.8 Congressional Power to Establish Article III Courts

ArtIII.S1.8.1 Overview of Establishment of Article III Courts

The Constitution established one federal court: the U.S. Supreme Court.1 In lieu of mandating the creation other adjudicative bodies through the nation’s founding document, the Framers vested the federal judicial power in the Supreme Court and “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,”2 and authorized Congress, in its discretion, to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the [S]upreme Court.”3 In the years following the ratification of the Constitution, Congress has regularly exercised its power to create different federal tribunals that adjudicate a variety of legal disputes.

As authorized by the Constitution, Congress has established federal district and appellate courts and structured the Supreme Court. Congress has also periodically created courts under Article III to exercise specialized jurisdiction over specific categories of cases.4 All of these courts, sometimes called “Article III courts” or “constitutional courts,” share three key attributes.5 First, they exercise the “judicial power of the United States” to resolve “cases” and “controversies” falling within the constitutional grant of federal court jurisdiction.6 Second, they are staffed by judges who hold their offices “during good Behaviour,”7 which the Supreme Court has interpreted to guarantee life tenure “subject only to removal by impeachment.”8 Third, Article III judges’ compensation cannot be “diminished during their Continuance in Office.”9

The following essays discuss Congress’s power to establish and abolish10 Article III courts, including the lower courts11 and courts of special jurisdiction,12 and Congress’s power to structure the Supreme Court.13 Other essays explore Congress’s authority to establish non-Article III courts14 and Congress’s authority to regulate the existing federal courts.15

Notes
  1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. ↩
  2. Id. ↩
  3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. For additional discussion of the Framers’ views on legislative power to establish federal courts, see ArtIII.S1.8.2 Historical Background on Establishment of Article III Courts. ↩
  4. In addition, Congress has created non-Article III tribunals, sometimes called “Article I courts” or “legislative courts,” staffed by personnel such as administrative law judges, military judges, and federal magistrates. See ArtIII.S1.9.1 Overview of Congressional Power to Establish Non-Article III Courts. ↩
  5. When determining whether a court is a constitutional court, the Supreme Court has looked at how Congress structures the court and whether the structure of the court adheres to basic requirements of Article III, rather than relying on how Congress labels the court. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion). ↩
  6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III to impose certain rules of justiciability, such as a prohibition on advisory opinions, requirements of standing and ripeness, and limitations on the ability of federal courts to decide “political questions.” See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); see also ArtIII.S2.C1.2 Historical Background on Cases or Controversies Requirement. ↩
  7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. ↩
  8. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982) (plurality opinion); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) (stating that Article III “courts are presided over by judges appointed for life, subject only to removal by impeachment”); see also ArtIII.S1.10.2.1 Overview of Good Behavior Clause. ↩
  9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also ArtIII.S1.10.3.1 Historical Background on Compensation Clause. ↩
  10. See ArtIII.S1.8.5 Congressional Power to Abolish Federal Courts. ↩
  11. See ArtIII.S1.8.4 Establishment of Inferior Federal Courts. ↩
  12. See ArtIII.S1.8.6 Courts of Specialized Jurisdiction and Congress. ↩
  13. See ArtIII.S1.8.3 Supreme Court and Congress. ↩
  14. See ArtIII.S1.9.1 Overview of Congressional Power to Establish Non-Article III Courts. ↩
  15. See ArtIII.S1.5.1 Overview of Congressional Control Over Judicial Power; ArtIII.S1.10.2.1 Overview of Good Behavior Clause; ArtIII.S2.C2.6 Exceptions Clause and Congressional Control over Appellate Jurisdiction. ↩

ArtIII.S1.8.2 Historical Background on Establishment of Article III Courts

Before the Founding, each state had its own system of courts, while the Articles of Confederation did not provide for an independent Federal Judiciary.1 At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates agreed early on to depart from existing practice and establish an independent federal Judicial Branch including a Supreme Court.2 The Framers generally accepted that state courts would play a significant role in interpreting and applying federal law.3 But, in light of concerns about whether state courts would apply federal law correctly, uniformly, and without bias,4 the Framers provided for a federal Supreme Court with the power to review state judicial decisions involving issues of federal statutory or constitutional law.5

However, the Framers debated whether the Constitution should also provide for the existence of lower federal courts.6 James Madison’s proposal for the new government, known as the Virginia Plan, provided for a “National Judiciary [to] be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature.”7 In the Committee of the Whole, the proposal to establish a national Judiciary was adopted unanimously.8 A clause providing that the Judicial Branch would “consist of One supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals” was initially agreed to, but later reconsidered.9 Critics of the provision argued that state courts could adequately adjudicate all necessary matters in the first instance, while appellate review the supreme tribunal would protect national interests and assure uniformity, and the provision for inferior tribunals was ultimately stricken out.10

Madison and James Wilson then moved to authorize Congress to “appoint inferior tribunals.”11 That proposal, sometimes called the Madisonian Compromise,12 carried the implication that Congress could, in its discretion, either designate the state courts to hear federal cases or create federal courts.13 Over the course of the Convention, the phrasing of the provision evolved into its present form, which vests federal judicial power in the “one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”14 Beyond that provision, the Constitution imposes few specific requirements related to the organization of the federal Judiciary.15

The first Congress exercised its discretion to create lower federal courts promptly in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the first legislation related to the Federal Judiciary.16 Since that time, the Federal Judiciary has always consisted of one Supreme Court and multiple inferior federal courts, though Congress has periodically enacted legislation to change the size of the Supreme Court and the size and structure of the lower courts.17

Notes
  1. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation authorized Congress to “appoint[ ] courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and establish[ ] courts; for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures.” The same Article further provided that Congress would be “the last resort on appeal, in all disputes and differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more states” and could appoint commissioners or judges to constitute a court to resolve such disputes. ↩
  2. See, e.g., MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 79 (1913) (“That there should be a national judiciary was readily accepted by all.”). ↩
  3. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 243 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter, CONVENTION RECORDS]. For example, the Convention considered proposals that would require federal questions to be decided first in state court, but with a right of appeal to federal courts. See id. at 243, 424. Likewise, during the debate over ratification, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “the State courts will RETAIN the jurisdiction they now have, unless it appears to be taken away in one of the enumerated modes. . . . [Thus,] the State courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). For additional discussion of the relationship between federal and state courts, see ArtIII.S1.6.1 Overview of Relationship Between Federal and State Courts. ↩
  4. Madison expressed concern at the Convention about “improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent Judge,” and “disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature or any numerous body” due to “the danger of intrigue and partiality” and the fact that legislators lacked the “requisite qualifications” to select suitable judges. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 3, at 120, 124. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (“State judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws.”); 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 3, at 124 (statement of Madison expressing concern about “the local prejudices of an undirected jury”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes.”); id. (“The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.”). ↩
  5. U.S. CONST. art. III; 1 Stat. 73, 85; Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295–96 (1921) (“I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as the laws of the several States.”). ↩
  6. For additional discussion of the Convention’s consideration of the judiciary, see 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1971). ↩
  7. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 3, at 21–22. It is possible that this version may not be an accurate copy. See 3 CONVENTION RECORDSid. at 593–94. ↩
  8. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 3, at 95, 104. ↩
  9. Id. at 95, 105. The words “one or more” were deleted the following day without recorded debate. Id. at 116, 119. ↩
  10. Id. at 124–25. ↩
  11. Id. at 125. ↩
  12. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 8 (7th ed. 2015). ↩
  13. On offering their motion, Wilson and Madison “observed that there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish them.” 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 3, at 125. ↩
  14. The Committee on Detail provided for the vesting of judicial power in one Supreme Court “and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the legislature of the United States.” 2 id. at 186. Its draft also authorized Congress “[t]o constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.” Id. at 182. No debate is recorded when the Convention approved these two clauses. Id. at 315, 422–23, 428–30. The Committee of Style left the clause empowering Congress to “constitute” inferior tribunals, but it deleted “as shall, when necessary” from the Judiciary article, so that the judicial power was vested “in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time”—and here deleted “constitute” and substituted “ordain and establish.” Id. at 600. ↩
  15. Article I appears to assume the existence of a Chief Justice of the United States, providing that “[w]hen the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. Other provisions govern federal judges’ tenure and compensation and set the bounds of federal court jurisdiction. See ArtIII.S1.5.1 Overview of Congressional Control Over Judicial Power; ArtIII.S1.10.2.1 Overview of Good Behavior Clause; ArtIII.S2.C2.6 Exceptions Clause and Congressional Control over Appellate Jurisdiction. However, the Constitution does not specify the size of the Supreme Court or the number or size of the lower courts. ↩
  16. 1 Stat. 73. ↩
  17. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73; Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89; Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132; Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420; Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176; Circuit Judges Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See also ArtIII.S1.8.3 Supreme Court and Congress; ArtIII.S1.8.4 Establishment of Inferior Federal Courts; ArtIII.S1.8.5 Congressional Power to Abolish Federal Courts. ↩

ArtIII.S1.8.3 Supreme Court and Congress

The Constitution provides for a Judicial Branch including “one supreme Court.”1 It also appears to assume that the Supreme Court will include a Chief Justice, stipulating that “the Chief Justice shall preside” over any Presidential impeachment trial in the Senate.2 However, the Constitution is silent on other matters such as the size and composition of the Supreme Court, the time and place for sitting, and the Court’s internal organization, leaving those questions to Congress.

Congress first enacted legislation to structure the Supreme Court in the Judiciary Act of 1789.3 Under the 1789 act, the Court comprised one Chief Justice and five Associate Justices.4 Congress enacted legislation to change the size of the Court multiple times during the nineteenth century. In 1801, Congress reduced the size of the Court to five Justices. The 1801 statute did not eliminate an occupied seat on the Court; instead, it provided that the change would take effect “after the next vacancy.”5 Congress repealed the 1801 law before any vacancy occurred, leaving the size of the Court at six Justices.6

In the early years of the Republic, Supreme Court Justices were required to “ride circuit,” spending part of their time hearing Supreme Court cases in the capital and part of each year traveling to hear cases in the lower federal circuit courts.7 For a time during the 1800s, the number of Supreme Court Justices tracked the number of judicial circuits, facilitating the division of circuit-riding duties.8 At its largest, during the Civil War, the Court had ten Justices, with the addition of the tenth seat on the Court coinciding with the establishment of the Tenth Circuit.9 In 1866, Congress reduced the size of the Court to seven Justices, a change widely viewed as one of the Reconstruction Congress’s restrictions on President Andrew Johnson.10 In 1869, under a new presidential administration, Congress expanded the Court to include nine Justices.11 The 1869 legislation was the last time Congress changed the size of the Supreme Court.

A notable unsuccessful attempt to enlarge the Court occurred in 1937, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Administration proposed court expansion legislation that many regarded as an effort to make the Court more favorable to President Roosevelt’s New Deal policies.12 Congress declined to act on the proposal, with the Senate Judiciary Committee expressing concerns that it impermissibly infringed on the principle of judicial independence enshrined in Article III of the Constitution.13 Proposals related to Supreme Court expansion also emerged following the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the confirmation of Justice Amy Coney Barrett in the weeks leading up to the 2020 presidential election.14 While no provision of the Constitution expressly prohibits legislative changes to the size of the Supreme Court, and Congress has changed the size of the Court multiple times in the past, some commentators debated whether the proposals were inconsistent with constitutional norms. The proposals were not enacted, and the Supreme Court has had no occasion to consider their constitutionality.

Proposals have been made at various times to organize the Court into sections or divisions. No authoritative judicial analysis of those proposals is available, but Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in a letter to Senator Burton Wheeler in 1937, expressed doubts concerning the validity of such a device and stated that “the Constitution does not appear to authorize two or more Supreme Courts functioning in effect as separate courts.”15 Other proposals would alter the size of the Court while also changing the Court’s structure or composition, for example by seeking to impose partisan balance on the Court.16 As with the foregoing proposals, the Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of these proposals.

In addition to setting the size of the Supreme Court, Congress also determines the time and place of the Court’s sessions. Congress once exercised that power to change the Court’s term to forestall a constitutional attack on the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, with the result that the Court did not convene for fourteen months.17 Congress also has significant authority to determine what cases the Court has jurisdiction to hear. The Constitution grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over the relatively narrow categories of “Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party,”18 and the Court has held that its jurisdiction over such cases flows directly from the Constitution.19 In “all the other Cases” subject to federal jurisdiction, Article III grants the Court “appellate Jurisdiction . . . with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”20 Supreme Court decisions establish that the Exceptions Clause grants Congress broad power to regulate the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.21

Notes
  1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. ↩
  2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. ↩
  3. Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. For additional discussion of the Act and its working and amendments, see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judicial Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923); see also JULIUS GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1971). ↩
  4. Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 1. ↩
  5. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89, 89. ↩
  6. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132. ↩
  7. The Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to circuit riding in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 299 (1803). A party challenging the practice argued that Supreme Court justices “have no right to sit as circuit judges, not being appointed as such, or in other words, that they ought to have distinct commissions for that purpose.” The Court noted that the objection was “of recent date,” and could not overcome “practice and acquiescence . . . for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system,” which yielded an “irresistible answer” that circuit riding was constitutional. Id. at 309. ↩
  8. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420 (creating the Seventh Circuit and adding a seventh seat to the Supreme Court); Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176 (creating the Eighth and Ninth Circuits and increasing the size of the Supreme Court to nine Justices). ↩
  9. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 100, 12 Stat. 794. ↩
  10. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209. Like the 1801 legislation, the 1866 law provided that the Court would decrease in size as vacancies arose rather than eliminating any occupied seats on the bench. The number of Justices did not fall below eight before the end of Johnson’s term. The 1866 legislation decoupled the number of judicial circuits from the number of Supreme Court Justices, and since that time there have usually been fewer seats on the Court than judicial circuits. ↩
  11. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. ↩
  12. JUDICIAL PROCEDURES REFORM BILL OF 1937, S. 1392 (75th Cong. 1937). ↩
  13. REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. Rep. No. 75–711, at 20–23 (1937). The Roosevelt Administration eventually abandoned the plan after the Supreme Court began to vote to uphold New Deal legislation. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). ↩
  14. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 2021, S. 1141, H.R. 2584 (117th Cong. 2021). ↩
  15. REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY: HEARINGS ON S. 1392 BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), pt. 3, 491. For earlier proposals to have the Court sit in divisions, see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 74–85. ↩
  16. See Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal To Improve The United States Supreme Court, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 547 (2018); Ganesh Sitaraman and Daniel Epps, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L. J. 148 (2019). ↩
  17. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 222–224 (rev. ed. 1926). ↩
  18. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2. ↩
  19. See ArtIII.S2.C2.2 Supreme Court Original Jurisdiction. ↩
  20. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2. ↩
  21. See ArtIII.S2.C2.6 Exceptions Clause and Congressional Control over Appellate Jurisdiction. ↩

ArtIII.S1.8.4 Establishment of Inferior Federal Courts

By vesting judicial power in “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” the Framers allowed Congress to decide whether to establish lower federal courts.1 Because Congress has the authority to decide whether the lower federal courts should exist, the legislature is also understood to enjoy broad power to structure the lower courts, make procedural rules for them, and regulate their jurisdiction.2

From the beginning, Congress has answered the question of whether there should be inferior federal courts in the affirmative. The first Congress exercised its discretion to create lower federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the first legislation related to the Federal Judiciary.3 The 1789 Act created thirteen judicial districts, each of which had one district judge.4 Single judge, trial-level district courts were to hold four sessions per year in each district. The Act further divided the country into three judicial circuits. It established “circuit courts,” which were three-judge panels comprised of one district judge and two Supreme Court Justices. One noteworthy feature of the new Judiciary was that Supreme Court Justices were required to “ride circuit” and travel to the districts within their assigned circuits to hear cases—a burdensome requirement, given the transportation technology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly for Justices who were old or unhealthy or were assigned to outlying circuits.5

As the Nation grew, the Federal Judiciary also expanded, with each new state receiving a judicial district.6 Congress reorganized the Federal Judiciary into six judicial circuits in 1801,7 and thereafter periodically added new circuits to encompass new states.8 In 1869, Congress enacted legislation creating circuit court judgeships.9 The new circuit court judges presided over cases within their circuits, limiting the need for Supreme Court Justices to ride circuit. Then, in 1891, Congress created intermediate appellate courts, known as the United States Courts of Appeals, abolishing the circuit courts and removing any requirement the Supreme Court Justices ride circuit.10 Since then, the federal judicial system has consisted of trial-level district courts with original jurisdiction over most federal cases, intermediate appellate courts, and the Supreme Court.

Notes
  1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (authorizing Congress, in its discretion, to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the [S]upreme Court.”); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 125 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (observation of James Wilson and James Madison “that there was a distinction between establishing such [inferior] tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish them”). ↩
  2. See, e.g., ArtIII.S1.4.2 Inherent Powers Over Judicial Procedure; ArtIII.S2.C2.6 Exceptions Clause and Congressional Control over Appellate Jurisdiction. ↩
  3. 1 Stat. 73. ↩
  4. The thirteen districts included one for each state that had ratified the Constitution at the time the Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted, plus districts for Maine and Kentucky, which were then parts of Massachusetts and Virginia, respectively. Id. ↩
  5. See, e.g., Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753 (2003). ↩
  6. Some states were eventually divided into multiple judicial districts, and some districts were given more than one district judge. See, e.g., 6 Cong. Ch. 4 (Feb. 13, 1801); 12 Cong. Ch. 71 (Apr. 29, 1812). ↩
  7. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89. The Judiciary Act of 1801 was repealed in 1802, Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, and soon thereafter Congress reorganized the judiciary into six different circuits, Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, §§ 4, 5, 2 Stat. 156, 157–58. ↩
  8. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2 Stat. 420; Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176. ↩
  9. Circuit Judges Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. ↩
  10. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826. ↩

ArtIII.S1.8.5 Congressional Power to Abolish Federal Courts

The Constitution provides that the judicial power shall be vested, at least in part, in “one supreme Court.”1 Thus, although Congress possesses substantial authority to structure the Supreme Court,2 Congress cannot abolish the high court.

With respect to the lower federal courts, the constitutional authorization for Congress to “from time to time ordain and establish” inferior courts may imply that Congress can alter the system it establishes, including by eliminating exiting federal courts.3 Moreover, having left to Congress the decision whether to establish lower federal courts,4 it would be anomalous for the Constitution to provide that, once a court was established, Congress could never eliminate it. Historical practice suggests that Congress may abolish lower federal courts, though the Constitution may limit its ability to unseat current federal judges in doing so.

The Constitution provides that federal judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and shall not have their compensation decreased while in office.5 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Good Behavior Clause to grant Article III judges life tenure, unless they resign voluntarily or are impeached.6 Thus, if Congress elects to eliminate an existing Article III court, it may raise the question of what should happen to the judges on that court.7

The first instance of Congress eliminating lower federal courts did not provide a clear answer to that question. The Judiciary Act of February 13, 1801, passed in the closing weeks of John Adams’s presidency, made major structural changes to the federal courts.8 Among other things, the act reorganized the existing three judicial circuits into six circuits and established six circuit courts consisting of three circuit judges each. President Adams appointed judges to many of the newly created seats, and those so-called “Midnight Judges” were confirmed by the Senate. However, in 1802, following a change in control of both the Executive and Legislative Branches, Congress repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801.9 No provision was made for the displaced judges, apparently under the theory that if there were no courts there could be no judges to sit on them.10

Congress enacted legislation to change the Court’s term to forestall a constitutional attack on the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, with the result that the Court did not convene for fourteen months.11 Once the Court reconvened, it rejected a challenge to the repeal in the 1803 case Stuart v. Laird.12 That case involved a judgment of the U.S. court for the fourth circuit in the eastern district of Virginia, which was created by the 1801 Act and then abolished by the 1802 Act. A challenger argued that the judgment was void because the court that had issued it no longer existed. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Congress has “constitutional authority to establish from time to time such inferior tribunals as they may think proper; and to transfer a cause from one such tribunal to another,” and that the present case involved “nothing more than the removal of the suit” from the defunct court to a new one.13 The Stuart Court did not directly address the issue of the displaced judges.14

On subsequent occasions when Congress eliminated Article III courts, the legislation provided for judges from the abolished courts to continue to serve on other Article III courts. In 1891, Congress enacted legislation creating new intermediate appellate courts and eliminating the then-existing federal circuit courts.15 The 1891 Act authorized sitting circuit judges, who had previously heard cases on the circuit courts, to hear cases on the new appellate courts.16 Congress again exercised its power to abolish a federal court in 1913, eliminating the short-lived Commerce Court.17 The 1913 legislation provided for redistribution of the Commerce Court judges among the federal appeals courts.18 In 1982, Congress enacted legislation abolishing the Article III Court of Claims and U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, instead establishing the Article I Court of Federal Claims and the Article III U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.19 The statute provided for judges from the eliminated courts to serve instead on the Federal Circuit.20

Notes
  1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. ↩
  2. See ArtIII.S1.8.3 Supreme Court and Congress. ↩
  3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. ↩
  4. See ArtIII.S1.8.2 Historical Background on Establishment of Article III Courts. ↩
  5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. ↩
  6. For additional discussion of the Good Behavior Clause, see ArtIII.S1.10.2.1 Overview of Good Behavior Clause. ↩
  7. In contrast to Article III judges, judges on Article I courts do not enjoy constitutionally mandated life tenure, so the elimination an Article I court does not raise this issue. See ArtIII.S1.9.1 Overview of Congressional Power to Establish Non-Article III Courts. ↩
  8. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89. ↩
  9. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132. ↩
  10. This was the theory of John Taylor of Caroline, upon whom the Jeffersonians in Congress relied. W. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 63–64 (1918). For full discussion of the controversy, see id. at 58–78. ↩
  11. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 222–224 (rev. ed. 1926). ↩
  12. 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 299 (1803). ↩
  13. Id. at 309. ↩
  14. Chief Justice John Marshall recused himself from the case and later expressed skepticism about the decision, noting ironically in one letter “the memorable distinction as to tenure of office, between removing the Judge from the office, and removing the office from the Judge.” Letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Henry Clay (Dec. 22, 1823), reprinted in Ruth Wedgwood, Cousin Humphrey, 14 CONST. COMMENT 247, 267–69 (1997). For another early example of legislation abolishing federal courts, see Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 762 (eliminating the then-existing circuit court, district court, and criminal court of the District of Columbia without providing for continued service by the sitting judges). ↩
  15. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826. ↩
  16. Id. § 3. ↩
  17. The Court was created by the Act of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539, and repealed by the Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 208, 219. ↩
  18. 38 Stat. 208, 219. ↩
  19. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, Section 105(a), §§171–77, 96 Stat. 25, 27–28; see also 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (“The court [of Federal Claims] is declared to be a court established under article I of the Constitution of the United States.”). ↩
  20. 96 Stat. 50. ↩

ArtIII.S1.8.6 Courts of Specialized Jurisdiction and Congress

Pursuant to its power to “ordain and establish” inferior federal courts, Congress has periodically created courts under Article III to exercise specialized jurisdiction over limited categories of cases. Those tribunals are like other Article III courts in that they exercise “the judicial power of the United States,” and only that power.1 In addition, judges on such courts must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, must hold office during good behavior subject to removal only by impeachment, and may not have their compensation diminished during their continuance in office.2 While judges on specialized courts must enjoy life tenure on the federal bench during good behavior, like all Article III judges, judges holding lifetime appointments to the U.S. district courts or courts of appeals may serve for limited terms on courts of specialized jurisdiction.3

Several Article III courts of specialized jurisdiction are no longer in operation, either because they were established for a limited time or because they were deemed not to have fulfilled their purposes. An example of the latter was the Commerce Court created by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910,4 which was given exclusive jurisdiction to enforce certain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.5 Another court of specialized jurisdiction was the Emergency Court of Appeals established by the Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942.6 The Emergency Court of Appeals was established during World War II and was designed to operate temporarily to adjudicate matters related to wage and price controls. Composed of selected sitting judges of the United States district courts and circuit courts of appeal, the court was vested with the powers of a district court and granted “exclusive jurisdiction to set aside such regulation, order, or price schedule, in whole or in part, to dismiss the complaint, or to remand the proceeding.”7 Congress created another specialized court through the Ethics in Government Act.8 That court, a “Special Division” of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, was charged with appointing an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute charges of illegality in the Executive Branch, upon the request of the Attorney General. It also had certain supervisory powers over the independent counsel.9

Perhaps the most prominent modern example of a specialized Article III court is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, established in 1982.10 In many respects, the Federal Circuit resembles the geographic circuit courts of appeals; however, rather than hearing appeals from district courts in a certain area of the country, it has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the United States Court of Federal Claims, the Federal Merit System Protection Board, the Court of International Trade, the Patent Office in patent and trademark cases, and in various contract and tort cases. One of those bodies, the Court of International Trade, is also an Article III specialty court.11 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, staffed by federal judges from other courts, is another Article III court of specialized jurisdiction authorized to transfer related civil actions pending in different judicial districts to a single district for trial.12

To facilitate the gathering of foreign intelligence information through electronic surveillance, search and seizure and other means, Congress authorized a specialized court in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.13 Known as the FISA Court, this tribunal is composed of seven regular federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice for limited terms and receives applications from the United States and to issue warrants for intelligence activities. Another specialized court, the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, was established to review ex parte applications from the Department of Justice to order removal of certain aliens from the United States based on classified information.14

Notes
  1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ↩
  2. Id.; see also ArtIII.S1.10.2.1 Overview of Good Behavior Clause. ↩
  3. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1788, 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (allowing for designation of district court judges to serve nonrenewable seven-year terms on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court); 8 U.S.C. §1532(a) (allowing for designation of district court judges to serve five-year terms on the U.S. Alien Terrorist Removal Court). ↩
  4. Ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539. ↩
  5. The Commerce Court operated for less than three years before Congress abolished it in 1913. See ArtIII.S1.8.5 Congressional Power to Abolish Federal Courts. ↩
  6. 56 Stat. 23, §§ 31–33. ↩
  7. 56 Stat. 31. The Supreme Court upheld the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the court in Lockerty v. Philips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943). A similar court was created to be used in the enforcement of the economic controls imposed by President Richard Nixon in 1971. Pub. L. No. 92–210, 85 Stat. 743, 211(b). Although the controls ended in 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, Congress continued the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals and gave it new jurisdiction. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–159, 87 Stat. 633, 15 U.S.C. § 754 (incorporating judicial review provisions of the Economic Stabilization Act). The Court was abolished, effective March 29, 1993, by Pub. L. No. 102–572, 106 Stat. 4506. Another similar specialized court was created by Section 209 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93–226, 87 Stat. 999, 45 U.S.C. § 719, to review the final system plan under the Act. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases (Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp.), 419 U.S. 102 (1974). ↩
  8. Ethics in Government Act, Title VI, Pub. L. No. 95–521, 92 Stat. 1867 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599). The Chief Justice designated three regular federal judges to comprise the court. Only one of the judges could be from the D.C. Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 49. ↩
  9. The constitutionality of the Special Division was upheld in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670–85 (1988). Authority for the court expired in 1999 under a sunset provision. Pub. L. No. 103–270, § 2, 108 Stat. 732 (1994). ↩
  10. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, 96 Stat. 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1295. Among other things, the Federal Circuit assumed the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See ArtIII.S1.8.5 Congressional Power to Abolish Federal Courts. ↩
  11. The Court of International Trade began life as the Board of General Appraisers, became the United States Customs Court in 1926, was declared an Article III court in 1956, and came to its present form and name in 1980. Pub. L. No. 96–417, 94 Stat. 1727. ↩
  12. 28 U.S.C. § 1407. ↩
  13. Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1788, 50 U.S.C. § 1803. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 also established an appellate court called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, which reviews certain FISA Court orders. See id. § 1803(b). ↩
  14. 8 U.S.C. §1532(a). The U.S. Alien Terrorist Removal Court has yet to conduct any proceedings. ↩