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Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 — Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction

Article III, Section 2, Clause 1

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

Essays on this page (9)

ArtIII.S2.C1.12 Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction

ArtIII.S2.C1.12.1 Overview of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction

The federal courts’ jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases derives from the Constitution and federal statutes. Article III of the Constitution extends the federal judicial power to “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”1 By giving the Federal Judiciary jurisdiction over admiralty cases—and authorizing Congress to regulate that jurisdiction2—the Framers sought to ensure that federal courts would resolve cases that might implicate the Nation’s foreign policy.3 The Framers also recognized that uniform federal admiralty jurisdiction could protect maritime commerce from the diverse and unpredictable procedural rules that state admiralty courts had applied under the Articles of Confederation.4

Beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress established the federal district courts and granted them “exclusive” and “original”5 subject matter jurisdiction over any “civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.”6 Congress also allowed state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over admiralty cases in which plaintiffs seek traditional common law remedies.7 Under the “saving to suitors clause” in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act, courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over most contract and tort claims that fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction because a plaintiff may bring a personal action against an individual defendant seeking common law remedies (e.g., payment of money damages).8 However, in general, plaintiffs must pursue actions in federal court when they seek remedies that lie against property in rem, such as the seizure of a vessel to enforce a maritime lien.9

Much of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on admiralty jurisdiction has examined the territorial extent of such jurisdiction and which types of cases fall within this limited grant of jurisdiction. Generally, courts consider the location in which a tort or crime occurs to be a major factor when determining whether the tort or crime falls within admiralty jurisdiction.10 The Court has held that, under the Constitution, admiralty jurisdiction extends to all navigable public waters, regardless of whether they are saltwater or freshwater, or subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.11 Admiralty jurisdiction also extends to contracts, regardless of where they are entered into or to be performed, provided that their subject matter is “essentially maritime.”12

When a federal court exercises admiralty jurisdiction over a case,13 it follows a special set of procedural rules. Notably, jury trials are unavailable in civil admiralty proceedings14 unless Congress provides otherwise.15 Thus, in federal admiralty proceedings, the judge typically decides issues of both law and fact. When a federal or state court exercises admiralty jurisdiction over a case, the judge must apply the substantive rules of federal maritime law,16 which is a type of federal common law17 that Congress may revise.18 In the absence of controlling federal maritime law, federal courts have sometimes applied substantive state law in admiralty cases when it would not interfere with the uniformity of federal maritime law.19 In some cases, such as those involving maritime torts in a state’s territorial waters, the Court has held that state law may supplement federal maritime law with additional remedies.20

This group of essays examines the Constitution’s grant of federal judicial power over cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The first essay provides an overview of the historical development of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the United States. Subsequent essays examine Supreme Court decisions that interpret the territorial and conceptual scope of this jursidiction. The essays conclude by discussing when concurrent federal and state jurisdiction exists over maritime claims and, alternatively, when such claims fall within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.

Notes
  1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Federal courts have treated the “admiralty” and “maritime” aspects of such jurisdiction as functionally synonymous. This essay sometimes refers to “admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” as “admiralty jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction generally refers to a court’s power to decide a case. Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 980 (10th ed. 2014). ↩
  2. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. § 2, cl. 1; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 32, 33 (1812). ↩
  3. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1666 (1833). ↩
  4. Id.; Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 456–57 (1847). ↩
  5. If a court has “original jurisdiction” over a particular subject matter, then it may hear and decide a case concerning that matter before any other tribunal does. Original Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 982 (10th ed. 2014). ↩
  6. The current version of this statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction is located at 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Congress also granted the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over prize cases, which have historically involved property (e.g., a ship) used by an enemy, captured during wartime, and brought into the United States. Id. § 1333(2). Under federal law, the district courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the seizure and forfeiture of a vessel for violating federal law. Id. §§ 1333(1), 1356. Congress also granted district courts in U.S. territories jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases. See The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 458 (1880). In general, district courts have discretion as to whether to retain admiralty jurisdiction over suits between foreign parties. Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy, Ltd., 281 U.S. 515, 517 (1930); The Maggie Hammond, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 435, 450, 457 (1869). ↩
  7. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 454 (2001); Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U.S. 118, 119 (1880); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337 (1816). Lawsuits brought under the savings clause in state court may not be removed to federal court unless independent grounds exist, other than admiralty, for the federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371–72 (1959). ↩
  8. For more on the relationship between federal and state court jurisdiction in admiralty cases, see ArtIII.S2.C1.12.8 Exclusivity of Federal Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction. ↩
  9. See id. In in rem admiralty proceedings, the court takes custody of the res or property. The property itself is made the defendant in the case, and parties who have an interest in it “may appear” and each “propound independently his interest.” Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 599 (1858). ↩
  10. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). ↩
  11. See, e.g., Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 41 (1942); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441–45 (1874); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563–64 (1870). Congress has some power to extend the territorial scope of admiralty jurisdiction. For example, in the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101, Congress augmented admiralty jurisdiction so that it encompasses claims that involve injury or damage to persons or property “caused by a vessel on navigable waters,” even if such injury or damage is “done or consummated on land” (e.g., collision of a ship with a bridge). ↩
  12. Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68, 72 (1877). ↩
  13. A federal court exercising admiralty jurisdiction is sometimes said to be “sitting in admiralty.” ↩
  14. E.g., The Whelan, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 112, 112 (1812); The Schooner Betsey, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 443, 452 (1807); The Schooner Sally, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 406, 406 (1805); La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297, 301 (1796). ↩
  15. Congress may, consistent with the Constitution, provide for jury trials in admiralty cases. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (noting that the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in admiralty cases but “neither that Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution forbids them”); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 460 (1852). The Great Lakes Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1873, provides that parties to a lawsuit involving maritime contracts or torts may demand a jury trial in admiralty cases that arise upon the Great Lakes, provided that the vessels involved meet certain conditions. ↩
  16. Federal maritime law incorporates common principles that commercial nations have recognized. The United States has adopted this maritime law through its “laws and usages” with some modifications to account for local conditions. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572–73 (1875) (“In this respect it is like international law or the laws of war, which have the effect of law in no country any further than they are accepted and received as such.”). ↩
  17. Federal courts have explained the content of the general maritime law. See generally Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 381–82 (1918); United States v. Ames, 99 U.S. 35, 35–36 (1879). ↩
  18. Congress may, consistent with the Constitution, revise federal maritime law. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932); In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 14 (1891). Congress might also rely, to an extent, on its power to regulate maritime commerce when revising general maritime law. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 577. See also, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”); id. § 8, cl. 11 (giving Congress power to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”). ↩
  19. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 158–59 (1920). See also Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340, 342 (1960) (holding that, in a wrongful death case, a state law may supply the standard for liability in a maritime tort that arises within the state’s territorial jurisdiction); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 320–21 (1955) (holding that state law governed the effect of marine insurance warranties when Congress had left regulation of marine insurance to the states). ↩
  20. E.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202, 215 (1996) (holding that state remedies for the wrongful death of a nonseafarer in state territorial waters were not preempted by federal law, where federal law provided no other remedy). ↩

ArtIII.S2.C1.12.2 Historical Background on Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction

The Constitution’s Framers were familiar with the concept of a separate and specialized admiralty jurisdiction. Prior to the Founding, the British Crown commissioned vice-admiralty courts in the American colonies.1 These courts, which were subordinate to the English admiralty courts, exercised jurisdiction over maritime cases that arose in the colonies independently of the colonial courts of common law and equity.2

In the years leading up to the American Revolution, the jurisdiction of the independent vice-admiralty courts led to disputes between the colonists and the British Crown. For example, the colonists objected to the Crown’s prosecution of colonists in the vice-admiralty courts, without trial by jury, for allegedly violating a British tax law, the 1765 Stamp Act.3 In 1774, the First Continental Congress’s delegates cited this extension of British admiralty courts’ jurisdiction “beyond their ancient limits” as one of the major grievances against Great Britain.4 Denial to the colonists of trial by jury in the vice-admiralty courts helped to motivate the colonists’ 1776 Declaration of Independence, which cited the British King depriving the colonists “in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury” as a justification for separating from Great Britain.5

After declaring independence, each state established its own admiralty courts.6 State admiralty courts adopted a wide variety of procedural practices, particularly with respect to the availability of jury trials.7 Although the Articles of Confederation authorized Congress to establish a tribunal to hear appeals from state admiralty courts in prize cases, this appeal mechanism failed to resolve many conflicts among state admiralty court decisions.8

Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 do not provide much insight into the Framers’ reasons for conferring admiralty jurisdiction on the Federal Judiciary.9 Delegate Charles Pinckney’s plan for the federal government, which he had submitted to the Convention, would have authorized Congress to establish separate admiralty courts in each of the states.10 In addition, the issue of admiralty jurisdiction received a brief mention in a Convention debate over whether the Constitution should specifically create lower federal courts.11 Delegate James Wilson argued that the “national Government” should have jurisdiction over admiralty cases because they would often implicate controversies with foreign parties that should remain outside of state court jurisdiction.12

Toward the end of the Convention, the Committee of Detail, which was responsible for drafting the Constitution, included the clause granting the Federal Judiciary admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in one of its drafts.13 This clause would establish uniform federal jurisdiction to resolve conflicts among the states with respect to prize cases, and the Convention delegates appear to have accepted it without controversy.14

Writing in the Federalist Papers in support of the Constitution’s ratification, Alexander Hamilton maintained that even the most adamant opponents of a strong central government had acknowledged that the Federal Judiciary should take cognizance of admiralty cases.15 Such cases, he wrote, “depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace.”16 The Founders believed that admiralty jurisdiction should extend to the adjudication of prize cases involving the capture of foreign ships17 and torts involving foreign ships,18 both of which could implicate foreign affairs.19 Hamilton also argued that federal courts should have exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty cases in order to provide uniform practices with respect to jury trials, which varied widely in state courts.20

By giving the Federal Judiciary jurisdiction over admiralty cases—and authorizing Congress to regulate that jurisdiction21—the Framers sought to ensure that federal courts would resolve cases that might implicate the nation’s foreign policy.22 The Framers also recognized that uniform federal admiralty jurisdiction could protect maritime commerce from the diverse and unpredictable procedural rules that state admiralty courts had applied under the Articles of Confederation.23 After the Constitution’s ratification, commercial maritime activity continued to expand throughout the United States. The importance of uniform admiralty jurisdiction grew as the Nation acquired new territories with inland waters and new inventions like the steamboat increased commerce on U.S. waterways.24

Notes
  1. Waring, 46 U.S. at 454; 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68–70 (Philadelphia 1893) (1768). See also STORY, supra note 3, at § 1659. ↩
  2. See supra note 1. ↩
  3. The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/resolves.asp. See also C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 141 (1943) (noting that the “rise of the vice-admiralty courts” was “prompted in part by the [British] Crown’s desire to have access to a forum not controlled by the obstinate resistance of American juries”). ↩
  4. See supra note 3. The colonial vice-admiralty courts had long exercised a more expansive jurisdiction than that of the English admiralty courts. See Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272, 304 (1874); Waring, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 454. ↩
  5. Nat’l Archives, Declaration of Independence: A Transcription. ↩
  6. Harrington Putnam, How the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 461–63 (1925). For example, Virginia established a court to hear cases related to “vessels and their cargoes,” which had jurisdiction over prize cases. Id. ↩
  7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). ↩
  8. PUTNAM, supra note 6, at 463–64. See also ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION OF 1781, art. IX. ↩
  9. PUTNAM, supra note 6, at 460 (noting that the subject of admiralty courts “received but scant attention in the deliberations of the Federal Constitutional Convention”). ↩
  10. Id. at 460, 465–66. See also, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 159 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (reproducing one version of the Pinckney Plan in a Committee of Detail draft). ↩
  11. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). ↩
  12. Id. ↩
  13. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 11, at 186–87. This draft granted the “Supreme Court” jurisdiction over admiralty cases but vested the federal “Judicial Power” in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. See id. The Constitution’s final text specifically extended the federal “judicial Power” to admiralty cases. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. ↩
  14. PUTNAM, supra note 6, at 469 (“[T]he experience of prize appeals, and the conflicts in the separate State courts, had prepared the Convention to accept a uniform Federal system, as essential to maritime commerce.”). See also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1658 (1833) (“The propriety of this delegation of power seems to have been little questioned at the time of adopting the constitution.”). ↩
  15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). ↩
  16. Id. See also STORY, supra note 14, at §§ 1664–1667. ↩
  17. STORY, supra note 14, at § 1662. ↩
  18. Id. § 1664. ↩
  19. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 475 (1793) (noting that “as the seas are the joint property of nations, whose right and privileges relative thereto, are regulated by the law of nations and treaties, [admiralty and maritime] cases necessarily belong to national jurisdiction.”). ↩
  20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). ↩
  21. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. § 2, cl. 1; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 32, 33 (1812). ↩
  22. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 456–57 (1847); STORY, supra note 14, at § 1666. ↩
  23. Id.; Waring, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 456–57. ↩
  24. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555, 562 (1867) (“[W]ith the vast increase of inland navigation consequent upon the use of steamboats, and the development of wealth on the borders of the rivers, which thus became the great water highways of an immense commerce, the necessity for an admiralty court, and the value of admiralty principles in settling controversies growing out of this system of transportation, began to be felt.”). ↩

ArtIII.S2.C1.12.3 Federal Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Generally

Since the Founding, the Supreme Court has grappled with the scope of federal courts’ “admiralty and maritime” jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution and federal statutes.1 The Supreme Court has held that “all suits involving maritime claims, regardless of the remedy sought, are cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction within the meaning of Article III whether they are asserted in the federal courts or, under the saving clause, in the state courts.”2 Generally, the Court’s cases analyzing admiralty jurisdiction have addressed when particular claims qualify as “maritime.” Such cases have examined: (1) the territorial extent of such jurisdiction; (2) its subject matter scope; and (3) the availability of concurrent state court jurisdiction over maritime claims.

The Supreme Court has held that neither Congress, the states, nor U.S. courts can enlarge admiralty jurisdiction beyond its constitutional limits.3 Congress has successfully enlarged the Judiciary Act’s initial statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the lower federal courts on several occasions,4 which suggests that it has not granted the courts admiralty jurisdiction to the full extent that the Constitution allows.5 However, the precise boundaries that the Constitution establishes for this jurisdiction remain unclear.6 The Court has suggested that various historical and policy-based considerations may delineate the jurisdiction’s boundaries, including the types of maritime cases that state admiralty courts could adjudicate at the time of the Constitution’s adoption;7 the Framers’ reasons for conferring admiralty jurisdiction on the Federal Judiciary (for example, to establish more uniformity in admiralty proceedings);8 and Congress’s practical need to address new “maritime concerns.”9

The extent to which Congress may reduce the scope of admiralty jurisdiction is also unclear. In one case, the Supreme Court suggested that “grave” constitutional questions would arise if the Court interpreted the Jones Act to prohibit federal courts from exercising admiralty jurisdiction over a seaman’s personal injury claims against his employer while allowing such suits at common law.10 The Court avoided ruling on whether the statute would encroach on the Constitution’s grant of admiralty jurisdiction by construing the Jones Act to allow the seaman to sue either on the “admiralty side” of a federal court with trial by judge or the “law side” of the court with a right to a jury trial.11 The Court’s decision suggests that the Constitution may impose some limits on Congress’s ability to withdraw certain maritime-related claims from admiralty jursidiction, at least when those claims remain cognizable in common law courts.

Notes
  1. Neither the Constitution nor federal law specifically defines the phrase “admiralty and maritime.” In one early case, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney noted the difficulties in ascertaining the extent of such jurisdiction. The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 522, 526–27 (1862). See also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574–77 (1874). ↩
  2. Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 367 n.23 (1959). ↩
  3. The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) at 527. ↩
  4. See, e.g., Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308; Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, id. § 30101; Ship Mortgage Act, id. §§ 31301–31309; Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act, id. §§ 30501–30512. ↩
  5. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Co., 373 U.S. 206, 209 (1963) (implicitly upholding Congress’s expansion of admiralty jurisdiction to encompass some claims arising from injury or damage to property caused by a vessel on navigable waters that the Court had previously held not to fall within admiralty jurisdiction when the injury or damage was consummated on land). ↩
  6. The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) at 526–27. See also The Belfast, 74 U.S. 624, 636 (1869) (stating that the federal power to hear admiralty cases extends to “all such cases of a maritime character as were cognizable in the admiralty courts of the States at the time the Constitution was adopted”). ↩
  7. Id. ↩
  8. The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) at 526–27. ↩
  9. Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 52 (1934). Because the Supreme Court often evaluates the scope of both constitutional and statutory admiralty jursidiction based on historical or common law factors, it can be difficult to ascertain whether some of the Court’s rulings are grounded in its interpretation of the Constitution or, rather, federal statutory law. See, e.g., T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 182 (1928) (holding that admiralty had no jurisdiction over a wrongful death suit arising from an incident in which a sling knocked a longshoreman working on a wharf to unload a vessel into the water without specifying whether Congress could confer admiralty jurisdiction over such suits by subsequently enacting a statute). ↩
  10. Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386, 389–90 (1924) (“[T]here are boundaries to the maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction which inhere in those subjects and cannot be altered by legislation, as by excluding a thing falling clearly within them or including a thing falling clearly without.”). The Court also indicated that, generally, Congress’s enactments modifying admiralty jurisdiction “must be coextensive with and operate uniformly in the whole of the United States.” Id. at 387. ↩
  11. Id. at 389–90. ↩

ArtIII.S2.C1.12.4 Territorial Extent of Admiralty Jurisdiction

Generally, courts consider the location in which a tort or crime occurs to be a major factor when determining whether the tort or crime falls within admiralty jurisdiction.1 Early in U.S. history, the Supreme Court interpreted the territorial extent of federal admiralty jurisdiction in accordance with the rules of the English admiralty courts.2 As a result, the Court construed that jurisdiction narrowly, limiting it to causes of action that arose on the high seas and rivers subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.3

The law changed significantly in the mid-nineteenth century when the Court held that the English rules on jurisidiction at the time of the U.S. Constitution’s adoption could not limit the territorial extent of federal admiralty jursidiction.4 In The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,5 the Court reviewed a federal law that extended admiralty jursidiction over certain claims that arose on the Great Lakes and connecting waters.6 The Court upheld the law, determining that the Constitution’s initial grant of admiralty jurisdiction embraced such waters, even if they were beyond the ebb and flow of the tide.7 A couple of decades later, the Court specifically held that admiralty jurisdiction, as conferred by the Constitution and federal statutes, extended to claims arising on all navigable waters of the United States.8

Thus, according to modern understanding, admiralty jurisdiction extends to all public waters that are navigable in fact,9 regardless of whether they are saltwater or freshwater, or subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.10

Notes
  1. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). ↩
  2. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429–30 (1825). See also The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175, 183 (1837); Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324, 343 (1833). ↩
  3. See supra note 2. ↩
  4. Jackson v. S.B. Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 299 (1858); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 455–57 (1851). See also Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 459 (1847); De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 443–44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (Story, Cir. J.). ↩
  5. The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 455–57. ↩
  6. 5 Stat. 726, 726–27 (1845). See also The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 451–52. ↩
  7. Id. at 457. ↩
  8. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555, 569 (1866). ↩
  9. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563–64 (1870) (defining “navigable in fact” as waters that are “used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water”). ↩
  10. See, e.g., Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 41 (1942): The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441–45 (1874); The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15, 20–21 (1869); The Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 301–02 (1858); Fretz v. Bull, 53 U.S. (23 How.) 466, 468 (1852). Claims that arise on artificial bodies of navigable water may be subject to admiralty jurisdiction. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 26–27 (1903) (intrastate waters of Erie canal); Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 632 (1884) (Illinois and Michigan canal); Escanaba Co. v. Chi., 107 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1883) (Chicago River and its branches). The jurisdiction also extends to waters that can be made navigable with “reasonable improvement.” United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407–09 (1940). Some earlier Supreme Court cases appeared to limit admiralty jurisdiction’s territorial extent to navigable waters with a nexus to interstate or international commerce. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 564–65; Nelson v. Leland, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 48, 56 (1860). However, these cases may have rested on the obsolete notion that congressional conferral of admiralty jurisdiction depended on Congress’s commerce power. See London Guar. & Accident Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 279 U.S. 109, 124 (1929); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 641 (1869). Because the Constitution explicitly includes admiralty jurisdiction within the federal judicial power, no separate nexus to commerce is required for that jurisdiction. ↩

ArtIII.S2.C1.12.5 Jurisdiction Over Categories of Admiralty Cases

In the modern era, most cases that fall within admiralty jurisdiction involve one of two subjects: torts committed on the high seas or other navigable waters; or maritime contracts or services, which often relate to shipping on navigable waters.1 State courts may have concurrent jurisdiction over maritime contract or tort claims that fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction when the defendant brings a personal action against a defendant, but generally only federal admiralty courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases in which the plaintiff seeks remedies against property in rem.2

Congress has also granted federal district courts sitting in admiralty exclusive and original jurisdiction over prize and seizure cases.3 Historically, prize cases have involved property (e.g., a ship) used by an enemy, captured during wartime, and brought into the United States.4 The court’s jurisidiction extends to proceedings in which a party seeks to acquire title legally to property taken as a prize.5

Cases involving the seizure and forfeiture of vessels for violating federal law or another nation’s laws also fall within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts.6 Vessels may be seized for engaging in activities such as conducting prohibited trade7 or violating the revenue laws.8 Federal courts also have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal cases against U.S. persons or vessels that arise within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, which generally encompasses navigable waters within U.S. territory but outside of any particular state’s jurisdiction.9

Notes
  1. Early in U.S. history, some federal courts of appeals held that federal admiralty jurisdiction encompassed a broader variety of contracts and torts than the jurisdiction that admiralty courts in England or its North American colonies exercised. These early courts looked to customary international maritime law for the extent of jurisdiction. E.g., The Seneca, 21 F. Cas. 1081, 1082–84 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1829) (holding that a dispute among a vessel’s owners over where it would be employed fell within federal admiralty jurisdiction); DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (determining that claims stemming from an insurance policy were within the nonexclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction). The Court later held that admiralty jurisdiction in federal courts is broader than that sustained in England. E.g., N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merch. Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 386, 389 (1848). See also Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272, 304 (1874) (“The Constitution, in the grant of the admiralty jurisdiction, refers to it as it existed in this and other maritime countries at the time of the adoption of that instrument. It was then greatly larger here than in England. The hostility of the common-law courts there had wrought the reduction.”). ↩
  2. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 460–61 (1847). In in rem admiralty proceedings, the court takes custody of the res or property. The property itself is made the defendant in the case, and parties who have an interest in it “may appear” and each “propound independently his interest.” Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 599 (1858). ↩
  3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1356. See also 10 U.S.C. ch. 883; The Admiral, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 603, 612 (1866); The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 557–58 (1818); Bingham v. Cabbot, 3 (3 Dall.) U.S. 19, 41 (1795). ↩
  4. The Sally, 12 U.S. (8 Cr.) 382, 384 (1814); The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cr.) 155, 162 (1814). See also United States v. Ames, 99 U.S. 35, 43 (1879); Jennings v. Carson, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 2, 20 (1807). ↩
  5. Supra notes 2, 3, 4 and accompanying text. ↩
  6. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1356. United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297, 301 (1796) (holding that an in rem proceeding involving seizure and forfeiture of a vessel for exporting arms and ammunition in violation of federal law was within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts). Accord United States v. The Schooner Betsey and Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 443, 452 (1808) (determining that Congress intended for federal admiralty courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over seizures of ships for violating federal law on navigable waters). ↩
  7. E.g., The Samuel, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 9, 14 (1816) (engaging in prohibited trade in violation of federal law); Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 293, 294 (1808) (violating French law by trading at a certain port); United States v. Schooner Sally of Norfolk, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 406, 406 (1805) (engaging in the slave trade); La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 301 (exporting prohibited weapons). ↩
  8. E.g., Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 511–12 (1927); The Brig Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 289, 289–90 (1815); The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391, 394–96 (1823). At least some cases involving the seizure and forfeiture of vessels on state navigable waters for violations of state law may be heard in state courts. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 153 (1943). ↩
  9. 18 U.S.C. § 7. See also United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 150 (1933) (noting that admiralty courts had long exercised jurisdiction over criminal cases that arose on navigable waters); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 266 (1893) (holding that federal courts had jurisdiction under federal law “to try a person for an assault, with a dangerous weapon, committed on a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States, when such vessel is in the Detroit River, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada”). ↩

ArtIII.S2.C1.12.6 Torts Committed on Navigable Waters

Maritime torts include injuries to persons,1 damages to property arising out of collisions or other negligent acts,2 product liability suits,3 and violent dispossession of property.4 Cases involving tort claims fall within admiralty jurisdiction when two requirements are met: (1) the commission or consummation of the act that gives rise to the claim occurs on navigable waters;5 and (2) the tort bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.6

The first requirement for admiralty jurisdiction, which is based on the location of the incident, is satisfied if the tort arises on the high seas or on other navigable waters of the United States.7 Prior to Congress’s enactment of the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1948, the Supreme Court had held that some claims arising from injury or damage to property caused by a vessel on navigable waters did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction when they were consummated on land (e.g., collision of a ship with a bridge).8 In the Extension Act,9 Congress enlarged admiralty jurisdiction to encompass many of these claims. The Court implicitly upheld that expansion of admiralty jurisdiction as within constitutional limits10 when determining that the jurisdiction ecompassed a tort that arose when a longshoreman slipped on loose beans that spilled from negligently packed cargo on a dock during a vessel’s unloading.11 In addition to Congress’s expansion of admiralty jurisdiction, the Court has maintained a few historical exceptions to a strict situs test for maritime jurisdiction.12 However, even with such congressional and judicial guidance, it may occasionally be difficult to distinguish maritime torts from land-based torts. For example, the Court held that admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to an injury caused by defective pier-based equipment that a dock worker suffered when unloading a vessel; thus, the worker had to resort to state law for a remedy.13

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the second factor, which asks whether the tort bears a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity, may also raise complex interpretive questions. For example, in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, a jet aircraft departing a Cleveland airport collided with seagulls, crashed, and sank into the navigable state territorial waters of Lake Erie.14 The owners of the aircraft sued a federal air traffic controller and others for negligence, seeking to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.15 The Court held that, in addition to establishing that the commission or consummation of the wrongful act took place on navigable waters,16 the plaintiffs had to show that the tort bore a “significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.”17 Because a land-based aircraft’s flight between two locations within the United States’s continental boundaries did not possess such a relationship, the Court held that federal courts could not exercise admiralty jurisdiction.18 However, the Court’s opinion in Executive Jet suggests that Congress may have some flexibility to expand admiralty jurisdiction to encompass claims like those at issue in the case by enacting laws that, for example, enlarge the concept of a “traditional maritime activity.”19

In other cases, the Supreme Court has determined that admiralty jurisdiction exists because a case involves a traditional maritime activity. For example, the Court upheld the exercise of admiralty jursidiction over a collision between two private pleasure boats on navigable waters—even though pleasure boating was not exclusively a commercial activity—because such a collision could impact maritime commerce.20 For similar reasons, the Court held that a dredging company’s vessel was engaged in a traditional maritime activity when it damaged an underwater freight tunnel while performing maintenance work.21

Notes
  1. E.g., Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 576–77 (1943); Atl. Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1914); Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626, 630 (1882); The S.B. New World v. King, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 469, 472–73 (1854). The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may recover under general maritime law for the wrongful death of a seaman. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970), overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). See also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 37 (1990). The federal Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308, permits recovery of damages for deaths of seamen and other persons that occur more than three miles from shore. ↩
  2. E.g., The Raithmoor, 241 U.S. 166, 177 (1916); Erie R.R. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 204 U.S. 220, 223–25 (1907); The Propeller Commerce, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 574, 579 (1862). ↩
  3. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, No. 17-1104, slip op. at 5 (2019); E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986). In a maritime product liability action, a federal court “acts as a common law court” and may derive federal maritime law from various sources, including “judicial opinions, legislation, treatises, and scholarly writings.” Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., slip op. at 4. ↩
  4. See L’Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 257 (1816). ↩
  5. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). Admiralty courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over maritime tort lawsuits between foreign parties. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 418 (1932). ↩
  6. Exec. Jet Aviation, 409 U.S. at 268. A federal court sitting in admiralty may proceed against defendants in personam in a maritime tort case. The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 215 (1867). When the “cause of the injury” is subject to a maritime lien, such as a vessel involved in a collision, the court may also proceed against the subject property in rem. Id. ↩
  7. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971). See also Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U.S. 171, 172 (1924); Phila. v. Phila. & Havre De Grace Steam Towboat Co., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 209, 215 (1859). ↩
  8. See, e.g., T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 182 (1928) (holding that admiralty had no jurisdiction over a wrongful death suit arising from an incident in which a sling knocked a longshoreman working on a wharf to unload a vessel into the water); The Panoil, 266 U.S. 433, 435 (1925) (determining that a case brought against a vessel for damaging a federally constructed dike did not fall within the admiralty jurisdiction because the dike was part of the land). Cf. The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649, 651–52 (1935) (holding that admiralty jurisdiction existed over a tort claim that arose when an injured passenger fell from a gangplank onto a dock because the gangplank was part of the vessel); Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647, 648 (1935) (determining that a longshoreman’s tort claims fell within the admiralty jurisdiction when he had sustained injuries unloading cargo from a vessel in navigable waters after a swinging hoist knocked him off of the vessel and on to the deck of a wharf); Doullut & Williams Co. v. United States, 268 U.S. 33, 33–35 (1925) (determining that admiralty jurisdiction extended over a case seeking recovery for damages to clusters of pilings driven into navigable waters and used exclusively as aids-in-navigation); The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 367–68 (1904) (claims against vessel for damage to government aid-in-navigation beacon fell within admiralty jurisdiction). ↩
  9. 46 U.S.C. § 13101. ↩
  10. See Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Co., 373 U.S. 206, 209 (1963). ↩
  11. Id. at 207–10. In the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, Congress provided seamen or their personal representatives a private right of action against employers, with the right of trial by jury, to seek compensation for injuries or death that occur within the course of employment. This right exists even if the injury occurred on land. Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 4 (1946); O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 43 (1943). See also Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 86–89 (1991) (addressing which workers qualify as seamen for Jones Act purposes); McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356–57 (1991) (same). State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Jones Act claims, which are personal actions. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994). See also Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 37–38 (1926). ↩
  12. See, e.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 90 (1946) (determining that a stevedore’s employee could bring unseaworthiness claims for injuries that occurred on board a docked vessel); Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 41–42 (1943) (recognizing that a seaman may claim maintenance and cure, which generally refers to living expenses and medical care, for injuries that occur on land because “from its dawn, the maritime law has recognized the seaman’s right to maintenance and cure for injuries suffered in the course of his service to his vessel, whether occurring on sea or on land”). ↩
  13. Victory Carriers, Inc., 404 U.S. at 204, 212. ↩
  14. Exec. Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 250 (1972). ↩
  15. Id. at 250–51. ↩
  16. Id. at 253. ↩
  17. Id. at 268. ↩
  18. Id. at 274. ↩
  19. Id. ↩
  20. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674–76 (1982) (“[T]he smooth flow of maritime commerce is promoted when all vessel operators are subject to the same duties and liabilities.”). See also Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 359, 362 (1990) (holding that admiralty jurisdiction existed in a limitation of liability suit involving a fire on a pleasure boat docked at a marina on a navigable waterway that damaged several other vessels because the incident could potentially disrupt maritime commerce); Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626, 629 (1881) (determining that a federal court could exercise jurisdiction over a tort claim involving a fully loaded vessel that had recently completed its voyage and was docked at a wharf at the time of plaintiff ’s alleged injury). ↩
  21. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 539–40 (1995) (determining that a tort claim fell within admiralty jurisdiction when it arose from damage to a freight tunnel and other buildings allegedly caused when a barge negligently drove piles into the riverbed). See also Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479, 480–81 (1923) (holding that repair of a vessel was a traditional maritime activity in a case in which an employee drowned when one of his employer’s tugs knocked him off a scaffold on a float near a vessel he was repairing). ↩

ArtIII.S2.C1.12.7 Maritime Contracts or Services

In contract cases, the subject matter of the contract, claim, or service controls whether a claim falls within admiralty jurisdiction.1 Contracts “purely maritime, and touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation, are cognizable in the admiralty.”2 The Supreme Court has not established a clear test for when a transaction is a maritime contract. Instead, the Court has declared that the “boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts” are “conceptual rather than spatial” and “have always been difficult to draw.”3 The Court has examined “precedent and usage” when determining whether a contract is essentially maritime.4

Contract cases that fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction5 include actions for pilotage charges6 or towage;7 actions for repair of a vessel already used in navigation;8 actions on bottomry or respondentia bonds;9 agreements of consortship between the masters of two vessels engaged in wrecking;10 cases arising under marine insurance policies;11 charter parties;12 compensation for temporary wharfage;13 contracts for loading or unloading vessels;14 contracts for transportation of passengers or merchandise by ship,15 which includes contracts of affreighment;16 contracts with materialmen for the repair or supply of a foreign ship;17 salvage services;18 suits by seamen for wages;19 and surveys of damaged vessels.20

Notes
  1. Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68, 72 (1877) (stating that admiralty jurisdiction “extends to all contracts, claims, and services essentially maritime”); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 459 (1847). Accord Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 611 (1991). Congress may authorize courts to refer disputes over maritime contracts to arbitration when the parties have agreed to arbitrate. Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 277 (1932); Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924) (determining that the New York legislature could grant New York state courts the authority to compel specific performance of an arbitration agreement pertaining to a contract made and performed in the state because it was valid under state law and the general maritime law). Agency contracts, which establish a fiduciary relationship between a principal and an agent, may fall within the admiralty jurisdiction if their subject matter is maritime. Exxon Corp., 500 U.S. at 612, overruling Minturn v. Maynard, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 477 (1855). ↩
  2. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 637 (1869). ↩
  3. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961). ↩
  4. Id. See also Norfolk Southern Ry. v. James N. Kirby, Pty. Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 25 (2004) (stating that the court must examine “whether the principal objective of a contract is maritime commerce”); Grant v. Poillon, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 162, 168 (1858). ↩
  5. Because of the Judiciary Act’s “saving to suitors” clause, the contract cases in this paragraph do not necessarily fall within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. Most contract actions may be brought in either federal or state court. See, e.g., Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 359–60 (1962) (“[An in personam] suit for breach of a maritime contract, while it may be brought in admiralty, may also be pursued in an ordinary civil action.”). For more on the exclusivity of federal court jurisdiction over admiralty cases, see “Exclusivity of Federal Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction.” ↩
  6. Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236, 243 (1872). Pilotage charges are fees owed to an individual who pilots a vessel in territorial waters. See id. at 237. See also Hobart v. Drogan, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 108, 119–20 (1836). ↩
  7. See Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 328, 642–43 (1900). Towage charges are fees owed to an individual who tows property for another person. Id. at 644–45. In several cases, the Supreme Court has examined clauses in towage contracts that relieve a party from liability for damage to the property towed. E.g., Boston Metals Co. v. The Winding Gulf, 349 U.S. 122, 122–23 (1955) (holding invalid a “contract designed to shift responsibility for a towboat’s negligence from the towboat to its innocent tow”); Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 85, 95 (1955) (determining that a towboat cannot “contract against all liability for its own negligent towage”); Sun Oil v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S. 291, 292–93 (1932). ↩
  8. New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy, 258 U.S. 96, 99 (1922); The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438, 443 (1819). Admiralty jurisdiction extends to such actions even though the repairs are made in dry dock rather than on navigable waters. North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119, 128–29 (1919). However, contracts and agreements that relate to a vessel’s original construction do not fall within admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 126–27. See also Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1922); Thames Towboat Co. v. The Schooner Francis McDonald, 254 U.S. 242, 244 (1920); Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532, 555 (1874); Roach & Long v. Chapman, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 129, 132 (1860); People’s Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393, 402 (1858). ↩
  9. See O’Brien v. Miller, 168 U.S. 287, 297 (1897); Ins. Co. v. Gossler, 96 U.S. 645, 648 (1877); The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129, 135 (1870). Historically, bottomry and respondentia bonds were a form of debt incurred to supply a ship during a voyage, enforceable in admiralty as a lien on the ship or cargo. The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. at 135; O’Brien, 168 U.S. at 288–89. The Supreme Court Court initially held that ordinary mortgages on ships were not maritime contracts, even though secured by a vessel, its gear, or its cargo, because they were not entered into with reference to “navigation or perils of the sea.” See Bogart v. The Steamboat John Jay, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 399, 401–02 (1855). However, Congress extended admiralty jurisdiction to encompass such mortgages in the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301–31309. See also Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 52 (1934). ↩
  10. Andrews v. Wall, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 568, 572 (1845). In one type of consortship agreement, shipowners or salvors agree to cooperate in salvaging a wreck and split the proceeds. See id. at 571. However, admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to contracts of partnership in the earnings of a single ship. Ward v. Thompson, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 330, 333 (1859), see also Vandewater v. Mills, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 82, 92 (1857); or most actions for accounting (i.e., a determination of how much one litigant owes another). Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 692–93 (1950). ↩
  11. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313–14 (1955); Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 31, 35 (1871). Although cases arising under marine insurance policies are within admiralty jurisdiction, state law may determine the outcome. See id. at 320–21 (holding that state law governs the effect of marine insurance warranties when Congress has not enacted conflicting federal legislation regulating marine insurance or occupied the field of regulation). ↩
  12. In a charter party, an entity hires a ship or its officers. See, e.g., Armour & Co. v. Fort Morgan S.S. Co., 270 U.S. 253, 259 (1926). ↩
  13. Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68, 77 (1877). Wharfage refers to a “contract for the use of a wharf by the master or owner of a ship or vessel.” Id. ↩
  14. Am. Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 456 (1947) (holding that jurisdiction extended to a stevedoring contract’s indemnity provision because “although admiralty jurisdiction over contracts partly maritime and partly non-maritime in nature is doubtful . . . [t]o sever a contract provision for indemnity for damages arising out of the performance of wholly maritime activities would only needlessly multiply litigation. Such a provision is a normal clause in contracts to act for others and no more determines the nature of a contract than do conditions on the time and place of payment.”). ↩
  15. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 427 (1867). See also Norfolk Southern Ry. v. James N. Kirby, Pty. Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 24 (2004) (holding that contracts for transportation of goods were maritime contracts even though the final leg of the journey took place on land by rail). ↩
  16. N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merch. Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 385–87 (1848). See also The Eddy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 481, 494 (1867); Morewood v. Enequist, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 491, 493–94 (1860). A contract of affreightment involves hiring a vessel to transport merchandise or passengers. Id. at 492. See also Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532, 536 (1956) (holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to claims arising from the alleged violation of an affreightment contract for transportation of passengers); Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Dimon S.S. Corp., 290 U.S. 117, 122 (1933) (determining that admiralty jurisdiction extended to a contract of affreightment provision that provided a lower freight rate in certain circumstances). At one time, the Supreme Court held that admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to contracts of affreightment for the transportation of goods within the boundaries of one state. Maguire v. Card, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 248, 251 (1859) (“So in respect to the completely internal commerce of the States, which is the subject of regulation by their municipal laws; contracts growing out of it should be left to be dealt with by its own tribunals.”). See also Allen v. Newberry, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 244, 245 (1859); Vandewater v. Mills, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 82, 92 (1857) (“This is nothing more than an agreement for a special and limited partnership in the business of transporting freight and passengers between New York and San Francisco, and the mere fact that the transportation is by sea, and not by land, will not be sufficient to give the court admiralty jurisdiction of an action for a breach of the contract.”). The Court later held that admiralty jursidiction extended to such cases. See generally The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 642 (1869). ↩
  17. The St. Jago de Cuba, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 409, 416 (1824); The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438, 443 (1819); The Aurora, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 96, 105 (1816). ↩
  18. The S.S. Jefferson, 215 U.S. 130, 143 (1909) (holding that claims for compensation for salvage services provided to a ship in dry dock fell within the admiralty jurisdiction); Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 626–27 (1887) (determining that salvage of a floating dry dock was not within the admiralty jurisdiction because it was used to lift ships out of the water and not as an aid-in-navigation). ↩
  19. Sheppard v. Taylor, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 675, 711 (1831) (stating that admiralty jurisdiction extends to a seaman’s action for wages, whether in rem or in personam). ↩
  20. Janney v. Columbian Ins. Co., 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 411, 418 (1825). Surveying a ship generally refers to inspecting it. See id. at 417. ↩

ArtIII.S2.C1.12.8 Exclusivity of Federal Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction

In Article III of the Constitution, the Framers granted the Federal Judiciary jurisdiction over “admiralty and maritime” cases to ensure that courts would apply uniform rules in deciding cases that could affect domestic commerce and might implicate foreign affairs.1 In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress conferred exclusive admiralty jurisdiction on the federal district courts2 while preserving concurrent state court jurisdiction over common law remedies so that the states could supplement the administration of federal maritime law.3

In practice, state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over most contract and tort cases that fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction because a plaintiff may bring a personal action seeking common law remedies against an individual defendant in most of these cases.4 In an in personam case5 under the common law, liability attaches to property only to the extent of the individual defendant’s title in that property.6 When bringing such maritime actions against defendants, the plaintiff may choose either federal or state court.

By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that, as a matter of statute, federal courts have exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over cases in which the plaintiff seeks remedies for maritime torts or contracts that lie against property in rem (e.g., the seizure of a vessel to enforce a maritime lien).7 For example, the Court held invalid a California court’s application of a statute that allowed the state’s courts to subject vessels to condemnation and sale in lawsuits brought directly against the vessels for breaches of maritime contracts.8 The Court determined that the federal courts traditionally had exclusive jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act over such in rem admiralty proceedings.9 Such actions were not saved by the Judiciary Act’s savings clause because they were based on civil (i.e., statutory) law rather than common law.10

Other in rem cases that are subject to the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction include cases involving limitation of a shipowner’s liability;11 prize, capture, and seizure cases;12 and suits against the United States.13 Only a federal court sitting in admiralty may enforce a maritime lien, which may arise, for example, out of a maritime contract or tort.14 State legislatures may enact laws providing for state court jurisdiction over in rem maritime actions only in certain, narrowly defined circumstances.15

In the absence of controlling federal maritime law, courts have sometimes applied substantive state law in admiralty cases when it would not interfere with the uniformity of federal maritime law.16 For example, in Southern Pacific Co v. Jensen, the Supreme Court held that a state could not apply its workers’ compensation law to stevedores injured when unloading a ship at a wharf in navigable waters under a maritime contract.17 The Court reasoned that workers’ compensation was not a common law remedy preserved for the state courts under the Judiciary Act, and that its application would interfere with the general maritime law’s uniformity in violation of the Constitution.18 In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, the Court held that Congress could not authorize the states to establish their own workers’ compensation laws for maritime employees.19 Although the Constitution permits Congress to legislate on maritime rights, obligations, and remedies, it forbids Congress from delegating its power to the states to create new rights by permitting the states to modify the maritime law in a manner that would “work material injury” to the “characteristic features” of the law or interfere with its uniformity.20

Other provisions of the Constitution may also influence federal admiralty jurisdiction. For example, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts sitting in admiralty from entertaining jurisdiction over lawsuits brought in rem against state-chartered vessels without the state’s consent.21 However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar admiralty courts from hearing lawsuits in rem in which litigants seek to recover state property, like a shipwreck, that the state does not actually possess.22

Notes
  1. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874). See also Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 381–82 (1918). ↩
  2. State courts may also lack jurisdiction over maritime cases as a result of federal preemption. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 415 (1954) (holding that federal law limiting a shipowner’s liability preempted a state statute authorizing direct suit against an insurance company). ↩
  3. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). If the Judiciary Act’s “saving to suitors” clause authorizes a litigant to bring suit in state court, the plaintiff may also choose to bring its claims on the “law side” of a federal court and obtain a jury if an independent basis for jurisdiction exists (e.g., diversity of citizenship) and the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 88–89 (1946). See also, e.g., Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20–21 (1963) (holding that admiralty claims joined with a Jones Act claim must be submitted to a jury “when both arise out of one set of facts”); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 388 (1924) (upholding suit on a federal court’s “law side” for a Jones Act claim as consistent with Congress’s power to “alter, qualify or supplement the maritime rules”). See also 46 U.S.C. § 30104. Jones Act claims may also be brought in state court. Panama R.R., 271 U.S. at 561. ↩
  4. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 359–60 (1962) (“[An in personam] suit for breach of a maritime contract, while it may be brought in admiralty, may also be pursued in an ordinary civil action.”); Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123 (1924) (“By reason of the saving clause, state courts have jurisdiction in personam, concurrent with the admiralty courts, of all causes of action maritime in their nature arising under charter parties.”); Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 643, 648 (1900) (holding that a state court could enforce a lien on a vessel for towage charges because the plaintiff had brought suit in personam against individual defendants rather than in rem against the vessel, placing the claims within the savings clause). The Supreme Court has held that, in general, federal admiralty courts cannot issue some forms of equitable relief (e.g., ordering specific performance of a contract). In re The Steamer Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599, 608 (1890). But see Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 690–93 (1950). ↩
  5. Generally, in personam jurisdiction refers to a court’s power over a person (or entity) who is a party to, or involved in, a case or controversy before the court, including its power to render judgments affecting that person’s rights. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 982 (10th ed. 2014). ↩
  6. A case does not fall within federal courts’ exclusive admiralty jurisdiction merely because it involves the issuance of an “auxiliary attachment” against the vessel. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U.S. 303, 306 (1915). In exercising in personam jurisdiction, a state court may “adopt such remedies, and . . . attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the substantive maritime law.” Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 561–63 (1954) (upholding state court jurisdiction over a lawsuit seeking a judicial order directing the sale of a vessel and the partition of its proceeds, in part, because the Court could not foresee any “possible injury to commerce or navigation if states continue to be free to follow their own customary partition procedures” and “the state court in this proceeding acts only upon the interests of the parties over whom it has jurisdiction in personam”). ↩
  7. Am. Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 446; The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 37 (1903); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. 555, 569 (1866); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 427 (1866). In in rem admiralty proceedings, the court takes custody of the res or property. The property itself is made the defendant in the case, and parties who have an interest in it “may appear” and each “propound independently his interest.” Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 599 (1858) (vessel as a res). See also United States v. Freights, 274 U.S. 466, 470 (1927) (debt as a res). ↩
  8. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 424–25, 431. ↩
  9. Id. at 427. ↩
  10. Id. at 431. ↩
  11. Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437, 439–40 (1932) (“[T]he state court has no jurisdiction to determine the question of the owner’s right to a limited liability, and [if] the value of the vessel be not accepted as the limit of the owner’s liability, the federal court is authorized to resume jurisdiction and dispose of the whole case.”). ↩
  12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1356. See also 10 U.S.C. ch. 883. ↩
  13. In rem proceedings cannot successfully be maintained against a vessel that is U.S. government property without the federal government’s consent. See The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1869). Suits against the federal government for injury caused by a U.S.-owned vessel’s negligence may be brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act. See generally 46 U.S.C. ch. 309. For further discussion of the United States’ immunity from suit, see Amdt11.6.3 Officer Suits and State Sovereign Immunity. ↩
  14. Federal admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive when litigants seek to enforce a lien created on a vessel or its cargo under general maritime law. See Cutler v. Rae, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 729, 731 (1849). States cannot enforce maritime liens in rem. The Glide, 167 U.S. 606, 623–24 (1897). See also Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256, 283 (1894); Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532, 557 (1874); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185, 190 (1871). However, when a tort is not maritime, a litigant may pursue the lien’s enforcement in state court when state law provides a lien on the vessel. Johnson v. Chi. & Pac. Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1886). ↩
  15. C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 134, 153 (1943) (upholding a California law authorizing state courts to exercise jurisdiction in a forfeiture proceeding involving a purse net seized from a fishing boat in navigable waters for violating state law because in rem forfeiture proceedings for violations of state law had long been recognized as a common law remedy not within federal courts’ exclusive admiralty jurisdiction). ↩
  16. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 158–59 (1920). See also Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340, 342 (1960) (holding that, in a wrongful death case, state law may supply the standard for liability in a maritime tort that arises within the state’s territorial jurisdiction); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 320–21 (1955) (holding that state law governed the effect of marine insurance warranties when Congress had left regulation of marine insurance to the states). In other cases, such as those involving maritime torts in a state’s territorial waters, state law may supplement federal maritime law with additional remedies if not preempted under federal law. For example, states may supplement federal maritime law with additional remedies for maritime torts in some circumstances. E.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202, 215 (1996) (upholding against a preemption challenge state remedies for the wrongful death of a non-seafarer in state territorial waters in the absence of federal remedies). ↩
  17. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217–18 (1917). ↩
  18. Id. See also N. Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142, 145 (1928); Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255, 257 (1917). The Supreme Court had previously allowed the states to regulate some aspects of maritime workers’ compensation. Sultan R. & T. Co. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 277 U.S. 135, 136–37 (1928) (upholding state law requiring companies to report number and wages of men employed and pay premiums into the state’s workers’ compensation fund); Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 477 (1922) (“[A]s to certain local matters regulation of which would work no material prejudice to the general maritime law, the rules of the latter might be modified or supplemented by state statutes.”). ↩
  19. See Knickerbocker Ice Co., 253 U.S. at 160, 163–64. ↩
  20. Id. at 158–60, 164. See also Wash. v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227–28 (1924). In 1927, Congress responded to decisions such as Knickerbocker and Jensen by enacting the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, a federal framework that provides for the payment of compensation to certain maritime workers for job-related injuries. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950. ↩
  21. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 494, 497 (1921). See also Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 503, 510–11 (1921) (determining that a claimant could not maintain suit against a state-owned vessel in rem when the state employed the vessel solely for its use); Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 565 (1900) (holding that a municipal corporation like New York City is subject to admiralty jurisdiction in an in personam maritime tort action because the city may sue and be sued). ↩
  22. Cal. v. Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491, 506–07 (1998). ↩